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Abstract
Private genomic companies have become a popular trend in the last two decades by
providing customers with information regarding their ancestry and health risks. However, the
profiles received from these companies can also be uploaded to public databases for various
purposes, including locating other family members. Both testing companies and public databases
have private interests, and both are at risk of law enforcement intervention for the purpose of
forensic familial searching. There is little federal legislation protecting the privacy of an
individual’s genetic profile. Consequently, it has been up to federal agencies, state laws, and
judicial precedents to prevent the misuse of genetic information in the modern age.
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From 1979 to 1986, the Golden State Killer was linked to over 50 rapes and 12 murders
in California (Kolata & Murphy, 2018). Over 30 years later in 2018, a deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) sample from one of the crime scenes was finally matched to Joseph James DeAngelo
after being run through GEDmatch, a public DNA database created for locating biological family
members in adoption situations (Mohr, 2019; Kolata & Murphy, 2018; Zhang, 2019). The search
resulted in several partial matches that were the genetic equivalent of third cousins. From there,
law enforcement constructed a family tree that was eventually narrowed down to DeAngelo
(Kaiser, 2018; Kolata & Murphy, 2018). With the rise of private genomic testing companies such
as 23andMe and Ancestry.com, there has been increased concern over genetic data privacy. This
includes how that data is used by law enforcement and other third parties, especially in regards to
familial searching in the case of the former. In general, the risk posed by accessible genetic
information is overexaggerated within its current applications. However, there is currently little
legislation protecting individuals from current and future systematic abuses by genomic testing
companies, third party databases, and law enforcement agencies. As such, the industry is largely
controlled by individual company terms of service, limited bureaucratic agency intervention, and
judicial precedent.
The more closely related two individuals are, the more similar their genetic profile is.
Individuals share half of their DNA with each parent, excepting paternal mutations, and the
degree of genetic similarity between siblings varies around 65% (Maguire et al., 2014; Bieber et
al., 2006). Conventionally, law enforcement agencies search for matches to unknown DNA
samples through different levels of genetic databases, which form a hierarchy known as the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). Local departments (such as cities or counties) have
their own databases, which are combined with other local databases in a state-wide database. In
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turn, state databases upload profiles to the National DNA Index System (NDIS) that is
maintained by the FBI (Office, 2001). When law enforcement agencies do not get a direct match
in database to the DNA profile in question, they are occasionally permitted to further investigate
similar results in case those partial matches are family members to the sample source. This is
referred to as familial searching (Haimes, 2006). From there, analysts are able to narrow down
the potential relative results by constructing family trees using the available genetic information
in combination with public records, obituaries, and social media profiles (Zhang, 2019).
In recent years, familial searching has been heavily applied to cold cases. Samples that
previously did not produce a match are run through databases again to search for family
members. Due to social factors, many individuals who commit crimes have relatives who have
committed crimes. Consequently, there is an increased likelihood that someone who committed a
crime has a relative already in the database. Furthermore, family members tend to live relatively
near one another, thus allowing law enforcement to narrow down the partial match results by
geographic area (Maguire et al., 2014). Currently, the only states that permit familial searching at
the state level are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Familial searching is currently not performed at a national level. It is
important to note, however, that a partial match is a moderate stringency match that occurs
incidentally as part of a routine DNA profile search, not strictly as an intentional search for
family members. Therefore, partial matches may be found through the (Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS) incidentally in states that do not permit familial searching, as all state databases
are still subject to partial matches (CODIS, 2016).
Conventionally, familial searching is conducted using short tandem repeats (STRs)
(Haimes, 2006). STRs are small DNA sequences only a few base pairs long that are repeated
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head to tail a variable number of times. Individuals possess two copies of each locus, one from
each parent, which may have different numbers of repeat units. These patterns become
individualizing when analysts compare how many repeats there are at particular loci to determine
if two DNA profiles came from same person. (Why, 2000). For familial searching, The Scientific
Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM) Committee on Partial Matches
recommends utilizing moderate stringency matching in conjunction with a likelihood ratio
because moderate stringency alone is of little value. Here, moderate stringency refers to two
profiles who match at least one allele at each locus. In contrast, high stringency matches are the
same at each locus (Scientific, 2009). Using STRs, familial searching is only reliable for parentchild or full sibling relationships. Distant relatives do not share enough alleles to associate any
more strongly with an evidentiary sample than the random chance that a stranger happens to
share those alleles (Ge et al., 2011a). In an experiment using the former 13 core CODIS loci
examined at moderate-stringency, almost no parent-child relationships were falsely excluded
(excepting the few situations where mutation was involved). Consequently, familial searching
using STRs is very reliable for parent-child relationships. However, 76% of sibling relationships
were incorrectly excluded, making familial searching difficult even among siblings (Ge et al.,
2011b). Therefore, moderate-stringency matching is of little probative value to distant relatives
in casework, which is concurrent with SWGDAM guidelines (Ge et al., 2011b; Scientific, 2009)
While law enforcement agencies use STRs, most major genomic testing companies
utilize single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) compared to the human reference genome (Raw,
n.d.; Downloading, n.d.). A SNP occurs where there are different common nucleotide residues at
a single point in the DNA among the population. There are approximately 10 million SNPs in
human genome, although only about 1000 are currently measured. Labeled arbitrarily the A and
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B alleles for the two different common residues, individuals may possess the genotypes AA, BB,
or AB based on which alleles they inherit from parents. As a result, SNP commonalities can be
used with the Markov Chain Monte Carlo modeling program to map the probability of an
individual descending from different subpopulations. This information is utilized in genome
wide association studies (GWAS) to determine linkages between SNP genotypes and disease
susceptibility. However, there may be false associations when the two variables are both simply
conserved within the ancestral line. Never the less, this ancestral information can be invaluable
for exploring ancestry associations as researchers do not need to rely on potentially inaccurate
self-reported ancestry information (LaFramboise, 2009). This technology thus forms the basis of
the ancestry and health tests provided by private genomic companies.
SNPs have lower mutation rates than STRs at 10-8 to 10-9 mutations per site per
generation compared to the 10-3 mutations per site per generation in STRs. Likewise, while a
single STR can have several different alleles based on the number of repeat units in an allele,
SNPs are limited to four nucleotide bases at each location. Consequently, many more SNPs are
needed to be individualizing, which requires the coordination of many primer sets (Oldoni et al.,
2019, Sanchez et al., 2006). One experiment by Pakstis found that using 86 unlinked individual
identification SNPs (IISNPs) resulted in match probabilities (the chances of finding two
individuals with same genotype) of 10-31 to 10-35, which is a higher power of discrimination than
the current STR 20 locus standard. However, researchers advocated that SNPs should be used as
a complement to STR in situations of degradation rather than as a total replacement of the
current system (Pakstis et al., 2010). Because SNPs are extremely small, they are impacted less
by degradation as long as a sufficient number of SNP locations are tested. Additionally, because
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SNPs do not use repeat units, they do not result in stutter peaks, which may be helpful for
deconvoluting mixtures with a large major to minor contributor ratio (Oldoni et al., 2019).
Rather than retest biological evidence using SNPs, law enforcement agencies can
compare one STR profile directly to an SNP profile. Consequently, evidentiary samples can be
used to search directly against profiles produced by private genetic companies. Using the
previous CODIS core 13 loci, researchers were able to identify 30-32% of parent-child
relationships and 36% of sibling relationships, although this was a lower accuracy than finding
an individual’s SNP profile through their own STR profile. The experiment was repeated later
following the transition to 20 core CODIS loci, and the accuracy improved to identify 40-54% of
parent-child and sibling relationships. However, researchers were optimistic that this statistic
could be improved by reducing the initial threshold for partial matches and then narrowing the
results by analyzing the partial profiles with other DNA tests and by constructing family trees, as
was done in the Golden State Killer case. However, both methods raise ethical concerns
regarding the privacy of families and the overrepresentation of certain groups in databases (Kim
et al., 2018).
As of December 2019, the National DNA Index System (NDIS) contained 14,078,725
offender profiles, 3,827,923 arrestee profiles, and 992,007 forensic profiles from casework for a
total of 18,898,655 profiles. California, which was the largest contributor to the database,
submitted 2,075,534 offender profiles, 822,802 arrestee profiles, and 110,365 forensic profiles
for 3,008,701 total profiles, aiding in 83,937 investigations. There are approximately 330 million
people in the United States (United, 2020). Therefore, in combination with CODIS statistics,
only 5.5% of the U.S. population is represented in NDIS. Familial searching is more effective in
areas where the DNA database size is large relative to the population, such as in the United

Terms of Service

6

Kingdom (Williams & Johnson, 2005). Consequently, familial searching is not as practical for
the United States in terms of population. Additionally, individualization is a concern not only
from DNA but from personal information. 58.4% of the population of the US can be uniquely
identified based on location, gender, and date of birth, although this number reduces dramatically
the less information is available regarding birth date. Case in point, only 3.6% of the population
can be identified from the above information if only the month and year are known, 0.04% if
only the year is known, and 0.01% if the date is narrowed down to a 2-year age range.
Consequently, this tactic is likely unhelpful for cases where police only have a general
description of a suspect. As a result, the largest potential privacy threat comes from companies
that have access to both your genetic and personal information, such as private genomics
companies (Sweeney, 2000).
There are four types of genomic testing: clinically meaningful, business, ancestry, and
recreational. Clinically meaningful tests are performed with the intent to diagnose and predict
information pertaining to a consumer’s health. The Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP)
supports this form of genomic testing under certain conditions. Business tests use a customer’s
personal genetic information to sell products individualized to that particular consumer. Such
tests do not meet AMP’s standards for “clinically meaningful” and are thus are not supported by
AMP. Ancestry tests provide information regarding biological relationships between individuals
but do not include health information. As a result, AMP remains neutral to these tests. Finally,
recreational tests do not provide health information but include some genetic based differences,
like food preferences. As these tests do not impact an individual’s health choices, AMP once
again remains neutral (Association, 2019a).
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23andMe was the first private genealogical company and remains a frontrunner in the
industry. As of January 1, 2020, 23andMe collects registration information, self-reported data,
and third-party data. Registration information includes a consumer’s name, date of birth, billing
and shipping addresses, and contact information (including license number), which is more than
enough information to identify an individual. Self-reported information is voluntary and includes
phenotypes such as eye color, height, race, health information, and family history. If the
consumer uses a third party website to connect to 23andMe, such as Google or Facebook,
23andMe is able to collect data from that site, such as your profile picture, gender, username,
age, language, country, and friends list, depending on the consumer’s privacy settings on that site
(Privacy, 2020).
Furthermore, 23andMe uses Google for some services, and Google is authorized to
collect and use data, although the details of what information is collected remains unspecified by
23andMe. Customers may opt out of Google data collection if they read the fine print of the
terms on conditions, but that requires a thoroughness of research many consumers neglect to
perform. Furthermore, some information is shared with other third parties, although 23andMe
claims that this sharing is strictly opt-in for sensitive information, including genetic information,
health information, some self-reported information. Likewise, consent is required for 23andMe
to use consumer DNA in research, which includes genetic information and self-reported
information that is de-identified and not linked to registration information when examined by
external labs. However, this information can all be used at an individualizing level internally to
23andMe for research (Privacy, 2020). 23andMe states they will not release individual-level
personal information to third parties without asking for and receiving explicit consent from the
customer, excepting court orders by law enforcement (Transparency, n.d.).
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23andMe provides two kit services. Their Ancestry Service provides genealogical DNA
results, but consumers can opt out of DNA relatives database. On the other hand, their Health +
Ancestry Service provides ancestral data in addition to information regarding genetic health
risks, gene carrier status, general wellness, and phenotypic trait reports. 23andMe does not have
its own sequencing lab, but instead contracts an external lab for sample processing. 23andMe is
required by the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) of 1988 to provide the
contracted lab with the sex and date of birth of samples, but no other information is provided,
and samples are identified with barcodes (Guide, n.d.).
Despite these protections, 23andMe may still be required to turn over genetic information
to law enforcement if court ordered to do so. However, 23andMe states that it will notify the
individual whose information is court ordered before giving any data to law enforcement unless
doing so would violate the court order. This allows time for the individual to oppose the order
before the information is provided. If the order requires the company not to inform the
individual, the company will inform the individual after the order has run out. However, the
company has discretion not to notify the individual if they believe doing so would pose a risk of
death or serious injury. 23andMe clearly states that their services are not intended for forensic
use. While their terms of service require that account information be accurate, they cannot
enforce such a rule, so they do not possess the means to accurately provide information to law
enforcement. Furthermore, they have no chain of custody and no guarantee that a customer sent
in their own DNA, even though the company’s terms of service requires it. To that end, it is a
violation of 23andMe’s terms of service for law enforcement to send in someone else’s DNA
sample, and 23andMe will not process samples that were not collected using their own saliva kit
(Guide, n.d.).
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In contrast to 23andMe’s detailed data protections and consumer safety focus, Veritas
Genetics has fewer protections and is tailored towards consumer concerns regarding disease
susceptibility. Their website claims that they sequence the entire genome and that 23andMe
sequences less than 1% of the genome, but Veritas provides no sources to back up the later
claim. Additionally, given that the SNP analysis does not require the use of the entire genome,
the comparison itself is functionally irrelevant and appears to be a concealed attempt at
manipulating public perception of both companies. Likewise, Veritas Genetics markets their kits
on the basis of giving customers “the peace of mind that comes with knowing [they] did not find
an increased risk for a specific condition” (Whole, n.d.). As a result of this fear mongering,
Veritas Genetics justifies charging $599 to $3599 for its various packages, an astronomical
increase compared to 23andMe’s $99 Ancestry kit and $199 Ancestry + Health kit (Whole, n.d.;
23andMe, n.d.). Furthermore, within their General Data Protections Regulations (GDPR),
Veritas asserts its right to hold on to consumer data for as long as they deem necessary within the
purposes outlined in the GDPR. This includes both personal information (such as name, location,
and genetic profile) as well as sensitive personal data (such as race, political opinion, religious
beliefs, health data, and sexual orientation). The GDPR permits Veritas to disclose consumer
data to third party processors like 23andMe does. However, the GDPR also allows data to be
transferred internationally for third party usage, and that transferred data is subject to the
(potentially lower) privacy regulations of the country it is sent to. Consequently, the majority of
the protections afforded by United States government agencies like the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) are bypassed. Finally, while Veritas Genetics states that it does not sell or
loan personal information to third parties, that clause does not outright prohibit the sharing of
information under various other circumstances (Privacy, n.d.). Clearly, there is a great deal of
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variation among private genomic companies, from the types of services they offer, how they
market themselves, and to what degree they utilize consumer information. However, genetic
information usage is not limited to testing companies themselves, nor are the testing companies
the primary resource for law enforcement.
GEDmatch is a database that allows individuals to upload their genomic reports obtained
from third party testing companies, such as 23andMe or Ancestry.com. The website was
originally designed to locate family members, particularly in cases of adoption. However,
searching is limited to the profiles that have been directly uploaded to the database, so the
individual being searched for (or an immediate family member) must have uploaded their own
profile as well (Zhang, 2019). Because STR profiles can be tested for similarity against SNP
profiles from private companies, law enforcement agencies are able to upload unknown DNA
samples from crime scenes to search for matches as was done in the Golden State Killer case
(Kim et al., 2018; Kolata & Murphy, 2018). Forensic familial searching was permitted on a
limited basis by GEDmatch’s terms of service for cases concerning homicide and sexual assault.
However, in May 2019 an exception was made to allow a search related to a violent assault case,
which violated these terms of service. In response, there was a large amount of community
backlash and GEDmatch changed its policy accordingly such that all users are now excluded by
default from police searches unless they voluntarily opt in. As of October 2019, about 163,000
users had opted in out of 1.3 million profiles. This has had serious repercussions for other
agencies that utilized GEDmatch, including the DNA Doe Project, a nonprofit organization that
used GEDmatch and FamilyTreeDNA to identify unidentified bodies. As a result, GEDmatch is
veritably useless to law enforcement agencies within the terms of service set out by GEDmatch.
However, there are still unethical ways to get around this restriction. Namely, law enforcement
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agencies are still able to upload unknown evidentiary samples under fake personal profiles.
While this a violation of GEDmatch’s terms of service, there is currently no method utilized to
monitor and remove this kind of activity (Zhang, 2019). Furthermore, GEDmatch was purchased
by Verogen, Inc. in December of 2019. Verogen is a forensic genomic company, so while the
company currently intends to keep law enforcement searches on an opt in basis, future policy
changes may sway information usage back in favor of law enforcement agencies (Mohr, 2019).
Like GEDmatch, Family TreeDNA is a genealogy database that allows users to upload
genetic profiles from third party companies. However, in August of 2018 the terms of service
were updated to allow the database to partner directly with the FBI without notifying existing
customers. CEO Bennett Greenspan has given conflicting stories while denying his involvement,
but he personally approved FBI usage. Unlike GEDmatch, Family TreeDNA uses an opt out
system, and as of October of 2019 only 2% of users had opted out. Furthermore, the company
appears to be moving towards capitalizing on law-enforcement usage, raising their prices for law
enforcement users from $100 to $700 per genetic profile uploaded (Zhang, 2019).
Given the sensitive nature of genomic and personal data, it is unsurprising that such
companies are under scrutiny by government agencies. On June 10th of 2010, 23andMe
(amongst other genomic companies) was issued a cease and desist order by the FDA. According
to the FDA, 23andMe’s genomic tests qualified as a Class III medical device under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). As such, the FDA argued that these tests posed a high
enough risk of danger that they could not be allowed on the market without FDA approval
(Wagner, 2019). 23andMe argued that their service guidelines stated that their tests were for
research, informational, and educational use only, not medical (23andMe and the FDA, n.d.).
However, the FDA was less concerned with the kits’ intended use than they were their actual use
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by consumers. The FDA was apprehensive that consumers would use the genetic risk reports to
make medical decisions without first speaking with a genetic counselor. This was particularly
concerning as such medical conditions reflected in the risk reports may never actually develop as
a result of environmental factors and lifestyle habits, and there is a degree of uncertainty
regarding the accuracy of the tests to begin with (Maxmen, 2017).
Consequently, 23andMe conceded and applied for FDA approval on July 30 of 2012,
making it the first genomic service to seek FDA regulation. However, rather than approve
23andMe’s request, the FDA sent a second cease and desist letter on November 22 of 2013
(Wagner, 2019). 23andMe complied with the second order and only offered Ancestry kits until
October of 2015 when they became the first (and only) private genotyping company to meet
FDA standards for clinical and scientific validity. Since then, 23andMe has been authorized to
provide genetic risk reports on select health conditions, such as Parkinson’s disease, late-onset
Alzheimer’s disease, and BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants associated with cancer (23andMe and the
FDA, n.d.).
On the law enforcement end, the United States Department of Justice issued an Interim
Policy on Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA Analysis and Searching that went into effect on
November 1 of 2019 (United, 2019). The document outlines restrictions on federally funded
investigations that use third parties for Forensic Genetic Genealogical DNA analysis (FGG),
familial searching (United, 2019). Although state and local agencies lie outside its scope, the
policy includes provisions on the use of both public genomics databases, such as GEDmatch or
Family TreeDNA, and genetic genealogy companies, such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com
(Zhang, 2019; United, 2019). The policy states that familial searching can only be used for
violent crimes (or the attempt thereof) or for identifying remains that are suspected to be the
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result of a homicide. Law enforcement agencies must first fail to produce a match from CODIS
and exhaust all other reasonable leads before being permitted to search external databases, and
the sample being searched must be from the presumed perpetrator or unidentified victim. The
privacy of these parties is further protected in that the agency is prohibited from examining the
genome for susceptibility to diseases, medical traits, or psychological traits. Most importantly,
the interim policy prohibits the storage, upload, and searching of data from external genomic
websites into CODIS, preventing the abuse of such databases and their users (United, 2019).
Furthermore, a suspect cannot be arrested on the basis of this search alone; the law
enforcement agency must perform an STR analysis of the suspect’s DNA and compare it to the
unknown evidentiary sample prior to receiving an arrest warrant. If partial matches are found
through the external database, law enforcement may request DNA samples from them but must
receive consent unless asking consent would compromise the integrity of the investigation. In the
latter case, investigators must consult and receive approval from the prosecutor and designated
lab official, obtain a search warrant, and collect the DNA lawfully. If FGG does not lead to an
arrest and criminal charges, law enforcement must destroy all third-party reference samples
(including amplicons and extracts) and delete FGG profiles, account information, and data
(United, 2019)
In June of 2019, the Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP) issued their updated
opinion on genetic testing companies to remain relevant to the current technological era. Their
2007 statement supported genealogical testing only through health professionals, while their
2015 statement supported private testing as long as it was clinically meaningful. Their 2019
statement has maintained their 2015 stance with the added provision that they remain neutral to
recreational and ancestral testing as they could serve educational purposes. Additionally, the
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AMP maintained that any health claims should be clinically valid and such validation data
should be provided to consumers with their individual reports. To ensure consumers were able to
make competent decisions using test results, the AMP advocated that test results should be stated
in terms understandable to laymen and include test limitations, how the results are significant to
the consumer’s health, and how the results may impact the consumer’s family members.
Likewise, they stated that the genomic testing company should be able to refer consumers to
genetic counselors and encourage them to discuss relevant test results with a healthcare
professional (Association, 2019b).
Despite these regulation and guidelines, some genomic companies are still liabilities.
There has been discussion of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigating genomic testing
companies for their handing and sharing of personal and genetic data with third parties. The FTC
has declined to comment on the status or existence of such investigations (Baram, 2018).
However, shortly after such rumors began, Ancestry.com and 23andMe updated their policies to
be transparent with who consumer data is shared with, supporting the possibility of a federal
investigation (Price, 2018). This would not be the first time the FTC has investigated companies
that use genomic data, either. The FTC has previously filed charges against Genelink, Inc. and
Foru International Corporation in 2014 for lax security and false advertising (in which
companies unfoundedly claimed their products could cure certain health conditions), both of
which are violations of the FTC Act (Wagner, 2014; FTC 2014).
Clearly, there are both strong benefits and concerns for the existence of genomic testing
companies. Outside consumer interests, these testing services provide immense amounts of
genomic data that can be used in research. A large number of genomes are needed to study
complex genetic linkages, which is often impractical for research groups. Consequently, public
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databases act as collaborative databases for secondary analyses (Erlich, 2014). Historically,
many genetics studies use genome-wide association studies (GWAS), in which researchers start
with a group of people with the same trait and then look for commonalities amongst gene
variants. However, large databases from companies like 23andMe allow researchers to use
phenome-wide association studies (PheWAS), in which researchers begin by looking at a gene
targeted by a known drug and look for traits that are associate with variations of that gene.
However, private companies also have external interests. In 2015, 23andMe hired Richard
Scheller to lead in-house drug development and signed a deal with Genentech to allow them use
23andMe’s data (Hayden, 2017).
The use of genetic companies to further drug research can be viewed either positively or
negatively. While the system aids research, there is no guarantee that the data will be helpful to
the public at large if the company decides the resulting product is not profitable enough, or if the
company charges an unreasonably high price for the product. Furthermore, genetic testing
companies may still not be the best solution. Genes for Good uses a volunteer-based Facebook
group to recruit individuals for genetic medical research. Participants take several surveys on
their health history and are sent DNA collection kits in the mail (Hayden, 2015). As of 2019, the
group had collected 27,000 DNA kits, exceeding their goal of 20,000 (Cell, 2019; Hayden,
2015). This program also benefits volunteers by providing them with ancestry and DNA results.
While the sample is skewed a bit towards younger females, it is largely representative of the
population and has a broader demographic range than 23andMe, especially in regard to
socioeconomic groups. Additionally, the program has signed a Certificate of Confidentiality with
the National Institute of Health, agreeing that the collected data will not be used by government
(Cell, 2019).

Terms of Service

16

Unfortunately, there are a variety of consequences behind genetic testing services that
require scrutiny. As previously mentioned, there are security risks from both hacking and
internal company use of genomic data. More than 80% of users opt in to share their data for
research, although 23andMe gives users the option to independently opt in for academic and
nonprofit research or for-profit drug companies. However, if an individual changes their mind,
revoking consent does not guarantee that the data and physical samples actually get destroyed.
Likewise, privacy statements are not static, so information that is currently protected may not be
protected later. Additionally, as cited by the FDA, there are concerns that consumers may make
dramatic health care decisions. Finally, there are a host of complications caused by law
enforcement (Rosenbaum, 2018).
Companies de-identify genomes to protect the privacy of consumers, but samples
can still be re-identified as needed to adhere to judicial subpoenas and warrants. 23andMe
advocates that it will resist cooperation with law enforcement, and both 23andMe and
Ancestry.com publish transparency reports regarding requests of them made by government
agencies (Rosenbaum, 2018). As of October 15, 2019, 23andMe has received 7 requests from
law enforcement for data from 10 different accounts, but no profiles have been distributed
(Transparency, n.d.). Inherently, genetic companies have more to lose by cooperating with law
enforcement than they do by opposing them, as the companies depend on consumer trust to stay
in business. Consequently, 23andMe and Ancestry.com are likely to continue to fight law
enforcement involvement (Rosenbaum, 2018).
These concerns have an understandable foundation, especially as law enforcement is
liable to make mistakes when using familial searching. Even in the Golden State Killer case,
GEDmatch identified 25 different potential family trees from the evidentiary sample provided by
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police. Those results were narrowed down to two other main suspects besides DeAngelo, one of
which was subject to a court-mandated DNA test prior to DeAngelo’s identification and arrest
(Leavenworth, 2018). Similarly, Michael Usry Sr. submitted a voluntary DNA sample to the
Sorenson Molecular Genetic Foundation as part of a church project. However, the group was
later bought out by Ancestry.com. When police searched the Sorenson Y chromosome database
for matches to a cold case evidentiary sample, they received a partial match at 34 out of 35 tested
alleles. Law enforcement obtained a court order to reveal Usry’s name even though it was
considered protected information in the database and proceeded to falsely accused Usry’s son of
the crime (Mustian, 2015).
The Florida Ninth Judicial Circuit Court signed a warrant permitting Detective Michael
Fields to search GEDmatch, including users that had opted out of being included in police
searches. This in and of itself set a dangerous precedent that may spread to other jurisdictions or
expand its scope to include testing companies directly (Jee, 2019). Prompted by the publicity of
the Golden State Killer case, Fields revisited a cold homicide case from 2001. The GEDmatch
search resulted in two cousins, who were then used to construct a family tree. Law enforcement
visited the homes of family members requesting DNA that they claimed was to search for
relatives to an unidentified body. Police later used this voluntarily submitted evidence to
incriminate Benjamin Holms Jr (Schuppe, 2020).
Such blunders lead to a growing public distrust of both law enforcement and genetic
companies, which can have serious repercussions for other groups. In particular, individuals may
be reluctant to participate in research studies or non-profit organizations, such as the Jane Doe
Project, due to privacy concerns (Erlich, 2014; Zhang, 2019). Furthermore, the use of genomic
companies by law enforcement toes the line of the Fourth Amendment, which outlines a person’s
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expectation of privacy and is cited in almost every DNA court precedent (U.S. Const. amend.
IV).
The Fourth Amendment states that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.,”
and is thus often debated in cases of an individual’s right to privacy (U.S. Const. amend. IV). In
United States v. Robinson in 1971, the Supreme Court ruled that a full search conducted when an
individual was under lawful custodial arrest was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, the full search was not limited to outer clothing and was not contingent upon
having probable cause that the search would result in something of interest. As a result, Robinson
set the stage for later cases concerning DNA collection (United States v. Robinson, 1973).
In Maryland v. King in 2013, the Supreme Court found that the Maryland DNA
Collection Act did not violate of the Fourth Amendment because the state’s interests outweighed
an individual’s right to privacy. The Maryland DNA Collection Act requires the collection of
DNA evidence in cases of attempted or completed violent crimes or burglary. However, the
DNA sample cannot be processed or added to any databases until the individual has been
convicted. Similarly, the DNA evidence is destroyed if the charges brought against the individual
are not supported by probable cause, if criminal action begins but the individual is not convicted,
if the conviction is reversed and no new trial is allowed, or if the individual is pardoned
unconditionally. As it stands, all fifty states require DNA to be collected from felons and 28
states and the federal government have laws regarding taking DNA from arrestees, although
there are some differences by state for which charges are testable upon arrest (Maryland v. King,
2013).
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The Maryland Court of Appeals had previously concluded that parts of the Act were
unconstitutional in allowing DNA to be collected, arguing that King’s right to privacy was
greater than the State’s priority of identifying him. However, the Supreme Court disagreed and
stated that while a buccal swab (the most common method of collecting known DNA samples)
was considered a search by law due to its intrusion of the human body, it was a minimal one as
there was no “surgical intrusions beneath the skin” (Maryland v. King, 2013). Technically,
warrantless searches and seizures are considered reasonable when they hold a strong public
interest, as outlined Illinois v. McArthur. The State argued that if an individual was already in
custody for a serious offense then the State already had probable cause. However, the Supreme
Court has held in Wyoming v. Houghton that there is a need to balance State interests against
individual privacy, and thus searches must be reasonable in both scope and execution (Maryland
v. King, 2013).
The Supreme Court had three primary justifications for their decision that the collection
of DNA from arrestees was constitutional in King. First, they stated that DNA was crucial for
identification purposes as individuals may use a fake name. Further supporting this stance, the
Court pointed out that fingerprinting as a method of identification is considered natural upon
arrest and is not considered a violation of 4th amendment as established in United States v. Kelly.
Second, the Court argued that DNA would be important in determining if the arrestee was
wanted for another offense. This information would provide law enforcement with the necessary
knowledge to determine if the individual was a risk to the facility staff or other detainees, if the
individual was a danger to society if they were released, and if the individual was likely to run
prior to a trial to avoid the conviction of a previous crime, all of which impact the bail set on the
arrestee for the current offense. Finally, the Court argued that collecting DNA from arrestees
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may help exonerate a guilty individual if the actual perpetrator is found incidentally. Part of this
decision noted that the CODIS core loci used in identifying individuals are noncoding and thus
do not reveal information beyond identification. A provision of the Maryland Act requires that
only DNA records regarding identification can be tested and stored. As a result, the Act itself
helps protect future privacy interests by preventing the storage of phenotypic information, which
could have negative ramifications such as racial profiling (Maryland v. King, 2013).
While King set a standard for DNA collection laws, it is still heavily debated because the
decision was made with a 5-4 majority, against which Justice Scalia wrote a heated dissent. He
maintained that the real intent behind the DNA collection of arrestees was solving cold cases, not
identification, as the arrestee profiles were run against unsolved cases, not just the conviction
database. Previous standards, including City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, have held that
suspicionless searches were allowed for certain reasons other than when the primary motivation
was the detection of a crime. Furthermore, Scalia argued out that while fingerprints are taken for
identification (which can lead to solving crimes), DNA is used to solve crimes and nothing else.
However, this point is up for debate as the majority stated that the identification of an
individual’s previous convictions is critical in deciding appropriate bail and other safety
measures. Finally, Scalia had concerns that the King decision would encourage the expansion of
DNA collection to arrests of nonviolent crimes (Maryland v. King, 2013). Regardless of the
decision’s voting margin, King has been cited as a precedent in several other cases
The People of the State of California v. Mark Buza based their decision on the King
standard but diverged from it due to differences between the Maryland Act and the California
DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998 being examined. The
California Act had a broader scope and fewer protections than the Maryland Act, requiring the
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collection of DNA from all felony arrestees without independent suspicion, a warrant, or a
judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause. DNA was uploaded upon arrest and
stayed in the database even if the individual was never charged or the case was dismissed. The
arrestee could seek removal, but the process was not automatic and it was up to the arrestee to
initiate the process. Even then, the request could be denied with no review (People v. Buza,
2014). In California, a felony is any crime that carries a minimum jail or prison sentence of one
year, including offenses as serious as murder to offenses as inconsequential as vandalism or the
sale of controlled substances (Legal, n.d.). Consequently, the California Act affected a much
larger group of individuals than the Maryland Act and required consideration outside of the King
precedent (People v. Buza, 2014).
Mark Buza was arrested without a warrant on felony charges, forced to submit a DNA
sample before being formally charged, and threatened with a misdemeanor charge if he did not
comply. The Appellate Court held that the DNA collection at the time of every felony arrest was
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case was sent to the California Supreme Court for
review, but the Court remanded it back to the appellate court for reconsideration when the King
case was decided. Upon the second review, the Appellate Court upheld their previous ruling that
the California DNA Act was unconstitutional. The Court argued that because the California Act
impacted people arrested for any felony before it could be decided if there was probable cause to
do so and data was not removed if the person was not convicted, that the Act constituteed an
unreasonable search and was a violation of privacy. Additionally, they built on Justice Scalia’s
argument that DNA identification could be compared to fingerprint identification as DNA
inherently contains significantly more information than fingerprints (People v. Buza, 2014).
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Country of San Diego v. Michel Mason likewise refuted the King precedent to a degree.
In response to a court-mandated paternity test, Mason argued that he had the right to request his
DNA be tested in an independent lab rather than the state lab. The State had no issue with Mason
submitting his DNA to the lab of his choice, but the State still wanted a sample for their own lab.
The Court agreed with Scalia that DNA had a privacy interest even if it was only used for
identification. Likewise, they support the Buza justification by stating that individuals have a
privacy interest in their own DNA information because it contains information beyond
identification, even if the DNA was obtained strictly for identification purposes. However, they
went on to say that an individual’s privacy interest was not absolute if there was a compelling
opposing interest. As such, the Court ruled that the State did not violate Mason’s right to
personal privacy (County of San Diego v. Mason, 2012).
Mario W. v. Superior Court took a different approach and broke the DNA processing
down into two separate searches. Arizona law requires juveniles to submit DNA samples for
testing if they are charged with certain offenses. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court
decision that the policy was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme Court
later overturned the decision and remanded it to the Superior Court. The Arizona law allows
DNA samples to be taken for identification, which was not the intent in the original case. The
Superior Court divided the situation into two separate searches: the initial DNA swab taken and
the analysis of the DNA. Previous standards hold that while some intrusions of the Fourth
Amendment are justified, the State required greater justification for the second, more invasive
search (Mario W. v. Superior Court, 2011).
The State argued that if the juvenile was released prior to the trial without submitting a
DNA sample and then did not show up for the trial that the State will have lost its chance to
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obtain the DNA. Probable cause to take a DNA sample had not been determined for the two
juveniles when their DNA was taken, but they were charged with serious crimes, which normally
allows for fingerprinting prior to obtaining probable cause (Mario W. v. Superior Court, 2011).
However, as discussed in Scalia’s dissent of King and in Buza, fingerprinting cannot be held on
the same level as fingerprinting (Maryland v. King, 2013; People v. Buza, 2014). Consequently,
while the Superior Court agreed that the first search to take a DNA sample was constitutional in
case the juvenile failed to attend their trial of a serious crime, they ruled that the second search
required greater justification in order to analyze the DNA before the juvenile’s trial. In particular,
the DNA profile’s analysis and subsequent upload to a database was a higher invasion of privacy
requiring probable cause, which was not present (Mario W. v. Superior Court, 2011).
Although unrelated to the King decision, Carpenter v. United States is crucial to the
discussion on familial searching in genomic databases because the Supreme Court held that
information that is provided to third parties does not dismiss the individual’s privacy interests.
Law enforcement had tracked a suspect’s cell phone to determine the individual’s location at the
time of a crime. The State argued that there was no expectation of privacy because cell phone
data is shared with a third party, the cell phone company. However, the Supreme Court argued
that cell phone records constituted a Fourth Amendment search. The Court cited United States v
Jones, in which the 5-justice majority argued that global positioning system (GPS) tracking had
privacy concerns while the dissenting 4 justices argued that information voluntarily turned over
to third parties had no expectation of privacy. Consequently, cell phone records held by cell
phone companies were not considered voluntary exposure because cell phones are considered a
necessity in the modern world and because cell phone data is sent automatically to companies,
not voluntarily (Carpenter v. United States, 2018).
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As applied to familial searching, identification is necessary to ascertain guilt prior to trial.
Therefore, individuals found and charged through public databases would pass Mario’s
precedent requiring identification to be the intention of DNA testing, making familial searching
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. While DNA has an inherent privacy interest, an
individual’s right to privacy is reduced in the face of compelling State interests. Therefore, even
under the Mason precedent, the Buza precedent, and Scalia’s King decent, familial searching
would be considered constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, while Carpenter ruled
that individuals had privacy expectations for information turned over to third parties, the decision
emphasized that the distribution of this information was not voluntarily. As a result, individuals
who submit their genetic information to third party databases such as GEDmatch may not have
their expectation to privacy protected by this precedent.
As has been illustrated, there is a vast amount of interplay between personal genomic
companies’ private interests, the use of third-party databases, the use of these systems by law
enforcement, and the decisions made by the judicial system. However, these trends suggest that
the technology behind these groups is not as inherently problematic as the individuals using the
systems for their own interests. 23andMe and similar genomic testing services provide ancestry
and trait information to consumers, but the company has external interests in biotech companies
and consumers are grossly uninformed about company policy and the significance of their own
test results. GEDmatch was created for the altruistic purpose of locating family members, but it
has been abused by law enforcement as an open-access database. Familial searching is a
powerful tool that can be utilized to locate suspects through their relatives, but it can also
implicate innocent individuals in casework.
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The Golden State Killer case may not have been the first familial search to be conducted
through public databases but it was certainly one of the most publicized, and as such it has
become a symbol of what can be done using modern technology. A cold case several decades old
was finally solved, even though the database also gave partial matches to several other
individuals. The case against Joseph James DeAngelo has yet to go to trial, but the pretrial
hearing is scheduled for May 12 (Canon, 2020). Conversely, in response to the plethora of
complications associated with it, several states have placed restrictions on family searching.
Maryland and the District of Columbia have banned it entirely. California, Colorado, Texas, and
Virginia permit it only after all other leads have been exhausted (Jones, 2019).
Private genetic testing companies and their use in familial searching is still extremely
new, and legislation has yet to catch up to these advancements in technology to thoroughly
regulate their usage. Until then, the FTC has issued a series of recommendations. First, they
advise consumers to compare the privacy standards of each company before choosing one, which
includes reading the terms and conditions. Second, they encourage users to consider their
account options, which give them choices on how much of their data to make public. When in
doubt, the FTC recommends individuals err on the protective side at first and loosen the
restrictions as needed once they know the site operations better. Additionally, the FTC asks that
consumers consider the privacy risks associated with providing personal information online, both
from hacking and from unethical company usage. Finally, they ask that individuals report their
concerns to FTC (Fair, 2017).
At the moment, judicial precedent is the primary protection for consumers. These
decisions protect many individuals from unwarranted searches, but they are not allencompassing, especially when faced with arguments of State interests. Additionally, all current
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protections from terms and conditions to judicial precedents are subject to change, so individuals
who are protected today may not be tomorrow. The regulation of these systems is and will
continue to be in a state of fluidity until further legislation is passed protecting individuals from
corporate and agency abuses. Consequently, while the usage of private genomic testing
companies is not harmful in and of itself, consumers should consider the entire situation prior to
submitting a sample, monitor the company for policy changes, and keep up to date on judicial
decisions pertaining to the use of DNA both by independent companies and law enforcement.
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